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Trends In Communist Propaganda 5 June 74

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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

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5 JUNE 1974
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Moscow, Peking Broadcast Services

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ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

MOSSOW CLAIMS TANGIBLE CONTRIBUTION TO DISENGAGEMENT ACCORD

Moscow has moved quickly to stake a claim to a share of the credit for the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement, using Gromyko's visits to Syria as visible proof of its diplomatic participation. A Brezhnev message to Syrian President al-Assad on the 30th, one day after the announcement of the agreement, expressed satisfaction that during preparation of the accord the Soviet Union and Syria "acted in concert, taking a united stand." No such message was sent to Egyptian President as-Sadat after the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement. The not-too-subtle message conveyed is that Syria achieved more than Cairo because it was willing to consult with Moscow and because it maintained a "principled attitude," holding out for the maximum advantage. The point was made explicit in a 2 June Moscow domestic service roundtable comment by Middle East specialist Belyayev, who pointed out that as a result of Syria's attitude, Israel was forced to relinquish not only territory taken in 1973 but some occupied in 1967 as well.

The Brezhnev message and other comment continues to stress that disengagement is only a step toward a final settlement. Brezhnev urged that the Geneva peace conference waste no time in proceeding to a solution of all questions of a settlement. Moscow has not acknowledged President as-Sadat's statement to journalists on the 30th that there must be ministerial consultations among the Arabs--bilateral, multilateral and possibly a summit meeting of concerned states--to reach "Arab understanding" before the Geneva conference is convened. Moscow in mid-May had supported a Syrian request for an Arab summit meeting, but apart from a Radio Peace and Progress commentary on 27 May, it has not pressed the issue. TASS on 4 June reported without comment an Arab League announcement that an Arab summit conference would open in Rabat on 3 September.

SOVIET, U.S. ROLES Stressing the Soviet role in the achievement of the agreement, Soviet UN representative Malik informed the Security Council, according to TASS on 1 June, that the USSR, "having participated in numerous contacts" during the preparation of the agreement, assessed the disengagement accord "positively." TASS commentator Anichkin on the 30th claimed a "tangible contribution" by the USSR to the disengagement agreement, adding that the Soviet role in resolving this question proceeded

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from the "generally acknowledged factor" that the USSR must participate in all stages and spheres of a settlement. In the roundtable program on the 2d Belyayev asserted that the Soviet role in achieving "very difficult and complex agreements" was "decisive," and the recent Damascus visit by Gromyko was the "very decisive element."

A Kolesnichenko commentary on 4 June complained to North American listeners that Western observers were distorting the Soviet stand on a Mideast settlement. He reminded his audience that the USSR "insistently urged" a Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement, and that Moscow and Washington had held "useful consultations" on the matter, exemplified by the Kissinger-Gromyko meetings in Geneva and by joint sponsorship of the Security Council resolution establishing the UN Disengagement Observer Force for the Golan front. Kosygin, in a talk with Austrian journalists reported in the Vienna DIE PRESSE on 31 May, referred to "continuous American-Soviet contacts" on the Middle East question.

Little has been said about Secretary Kissinger's personal role, although Belyayev in the 2 June program did refer in passing to negotiations conducted by Secretary Kissinger in Damascus and Jerusalem. A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Arabic on 1 June listed various factors, including Arab use of the oil weapon, which combined to "force" the United States to send the secretary on shuttle diplomacy between Syria and Israel. The broadcast charged that "imperialist propaganda" was trying to credit the Sinai and Golan disengagement accords to U.S. diplomatic efforts alone.

TASS on the 4th acknowledged the White House announcement that President Nixon would tour a number of Middle East countries from 12 to 18 June, and the same day reported Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam as stating at a press conference that U.S.-Syrian diplomatic relations would soon be restored.

PALESTINIAN ISSUE Belyayev, in the roundtable program on the 2d, is the only Soviet commentator thus far to have acknowledged that the "Palestinian problem" was raised during the negotiations. He said that Israel demanded that Syria give "some sort of guarantees" that the buffer zone would not be used as staging grounds for actions by "Palestinian partisans," and that Syria declined to speak for the Palestinians, referring the secretary of state to the "sole representative" of the Palestinians, the Palestine Liberation Organization. Moscow did not pick up

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Prime Minister Meir's remark, in her 30 May statement to the Knesset, that the United States would not view Israeli actions to counter terrorism as a violation of the cease-fire and would give them political support. But a Moscow Arabic-language commentary on the 3d referred obliquely to this U.S. assurance in citing Western press reports that Israel intends to continue fighting the Palestinian resistance movement on the pretext of working against terrorism, and the United States "wants to support this Israeli action against the Palestinian Arab people."

The Soviet Union is already on record (in the Soviet-Egyptian communique on Foreign Minister Fahmi's January visit to Moscow) as supporting Palestinian representation at the Geneva peace conference, but it has not explicitly endorsed a PLO delegation. For that matter, Moscow has not formally recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, despite Belyayev's remark to that effect. Moscow may be awaiting decisions by the Palestinians on attendance at Geneva and on the question of establishing a Palestinian "national authority." These issues are being debated at the 12th session of the Palestine National Council which opened in Cairo on 1 June. TASS on the 4th reported a message of greetings to the council from the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, the same organization which has hosted Palestinian delegations visiting the Soviet Union.

Apart from the question of representation, Moscow has continued to press for a Palestinian presence at Geneva. A commentary in Arabic on the 4th noted that new Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, in his policy statement to the Knesset on the 3d, rejected the Palestinians' right to return to their land and opposed Palestinian participation at Geneva. Arguing that the Palestinian problem was one of the main issues to be solved at the peace conference, the broadcast warned that a failure to agree on Palestinian representation at the conference could freeze the solution of all other issues.

Comment on the Palestine council session has noted that it assumed particular importance since, with the Sinai and Golan disengagement accords concluded, there is now a favorable opportunity for discussion of "basic" issues. Soviet media have more than once in the past displayed impatience at the disarray among the Palestinian organizations, and hints of this have emerged in coverage of the current meeting. IZVESTIYA's Cairo correspondent, according to TASS on the 3d, reported that speakers at the council session called for a consolidation of the forces of the Palestinian organizations and the adoption of a "single political platform." Belyayev, in the

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roundtable program on 2 June, said that it was extremely important that the Palestinians should be given the opportunity to state their case, and that world public opinion should have a chance to hear "exactly what it is they want." What is needed, said Belyayev, is a solution that would accommodate the Palestinians themselves, "whether it is a case of an independent Arab Palestinian state or of some other version." He defined a "just" solution as one insuring the Palestinians' national rights, and "this also means their rights to self-determination." Belyayev said that the Palestinian problem would be one of the most intricate and difficult to solve, but that without such a solution peace in the Middle East would be virtually impossible.

CHINESE VIEW ACCORD AS U.S. ADVANCE IN SUPERPOWER RIVALRY

Peking's portrayal of the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement reflects Peking's recent concern with highlighting superpower rivalry as the salient feature of the Middle East situation, while softpedaling Chinese disagreement with peace moves in the area. On 31 May NCNA accompanied its straightforward report on the terms and signing of the disengagement agreement with a lengthy commentary calling Secretary Kissinger's recent trip another successful U.S. "trial of strength" against Soviet influence. Only the final paragraph of the NCNA commentary noted China's view that despite disengagement, "the fundamental question" in the Middle East remains unsolved, since Israel has not withdrawn from all Arab territories seized in 1967 and Palestinian rights have not been restored.

Chou En-lai's 30 May message to the 12th Palestine National Council also had avoided criticizing recent Middle East peace moves, blandly noting that the Arabs should persevere in "struggle" to overcome "temporary difficulties." Chou did not greet the 11th council session in January 1973, but his message to the April 1972 conclave had warned against "all sorts of schemes of the enemy" and had advocated pursuit of "armed struggle."

In treating U.S.-Soviet rivalry, NCNA recited a list of recent U.S. accomplishments and Soviet failings in the Middle East to demonstrate that results of the superpower competition since the October war have shown that "the United States has repeatedly got the upper hand." While duly criticizing the influence of superpower competition on the Middle East, NCNA focused in a straightforward way on Secretary Kissinger's five Middle East trips since

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October. It described U.S. gains in consolidating relations with Egypt, Syria and other Arab states, cited a Western press observation that Kissinger's work had produced "fundamental changes in the balance of power between the United States and USSR," and noted that Kissinger in his most recent trip once again "disregarded Soviet revisionism" in bringing about a settlement. After noting a corresponding decline in Soviet influence, particularly in Egypt, NCNA said that Moscow is now reacting strongly by "unfolding another violent contention with its rival." It focused on Gromyko's 7 May meeting with Kissinger in Cyprus and his recent jaunts to Damascus, suggesting these were designed to "intercept" and offset Washington's gains.

Peking portrayed recent U.S. and Soviet aid offers to the Middle East as "baits" in their competition, noting that Moscow's policy there was even more self-serving than that of the United States. After mentioning expected trips by President Nixon and Brezhnev to the Middle East in the near future, it predicted that superpower contention would become "more and more acute."

Superpower contention was also the watchword in NCNA's 31 May report on UN Security Council meetings to establish the UN Disengagement Observer Force. While noting that the Chinese representative once again refused to take part in the vote on UN observer forces, the report disclosed Soviet dissatisfaction with the introduction of the U.S. draft resolution at the meeting on the 30th. It said there was prolonged "backstage bargaining" and public quarreling between the U.S. and Soviet representatives before the original U.S. draft resolution was introduced on the 31st as a "joint U.S.-Soviet draft resolution".

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

MOSCOW SEES CONTINUITY IN WEST DESPITE LEADERSHIP CHANGES

Despite the recent epidemic of Western government leadership changes which have already swept from office such supporters of detente as Pompidou and Brandt and encouraged speculation over the future of President Nixon's authority, Moscow has been slow to address itself directly to the question of how these developments may affect the structure and climate of East-West relations. Indeed, official statements and authoritative comment have avoided acknowledging concern by not stating the issue in such comprehensive terms; each case has been treated as a separate phenomenon with origins peculiar to the country in question. With respect to the FRG, France, and the United States separately, however, Soviet media have gone to some lengths to point out that the policies of the affected countries, as distinct from the fortunes of the leaders, show every promise of continuing on track. Nevertheless, despite the image of serenity it has projected, Moscow has taken care to back up its optimism with practical steps aimed at cultivating good relations with the new leaders and other influential political figures, and, in the case of the United States, at opening up new lines of communication with Congress.

Moscow has always insulated itself from accusations that its detente policy depended too heavily upon the cooperation of foreign governments by denying that detente rested upon the "good will" of Western leaders or other short-term considerations. It has argued that because of worldwide developments since the end of World War II--primarily the growing strength of the socialist countries--the leaders of the West have had no alternative but to cooperate with the socialist world on the basis of peaceful coexistence.

Recent more specific discussion of the current "crisis of leadership" in the West has stressed that policies derive from state interests, not the whims of individual leaders. A Moscow commentary broadcast to East Europe beginning on 23 May, for example, reassured listeners that "changes of personalities in politics do not at all mean changes in the policies themselves." While granting that "full respect" must be given to the role of individual politicians who have facilitated the process, the commentary pointed out that "detente is an objective process, and its fate lies in the hands of nations and states." This line of argument stands in contrast to commentary in the past, which has marked the role of personal diplomacy in bringing about the successes of Soviet detente policy.

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FUTURE OF U.S. RELATIONS

Confidence in the continuity of U.S.-Soviet relations in particular was expressed most directly by PRAVDA's senior political observer Yuriv Zhukov, in the 11 May broadcast of his regular Moscow television program on which he often answers questions from listeners on sensitive issues not broached directly in the printed media. Couching his discussion in terms of the possibility of a U.S. Democratic Party victory in 1976, Zhukov told one listener that "of course" U.S.-Soviet agreements would remain in force "if the new president" was of another party. Backing up his assertion, he added: "Agreements are made not between statesmen, or even parties, but between states, in whose behalf they act while in power."

To buttress his argument that the U.S. support for detente is bipartisan, Zhukov cited remarks by Senator Kennedy during his recent visit to the Soviet Union, asserting that he stated that "the present U.S. course of improving relations with the USSR is a continuation of the line proclaimed by his deceased brother, John Kennedy." The citation is the more notable since the picture of U.S. foreign policy history which it presents is in marked contrast to the conventional Soviet analysis which has emphasized the scope of the shift resulting from President Nixon's election in 1969 and which has contested the argument that the origins of the end of the cold war were laid during the Kennedy administration. As recently as in the April issue of the USA Journal, a review of a book on the foreign policy of the Kennedy administration cited approvingly its criticism of Kennedy for his policy of "confrontation with the USSR" and pointed to his years in office as "characterized by an unprecedented escalation of the arms race and increased aggressiveness by American imperialism."

The May visit to the United States of a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by CPSU Central Committee Secretary and alternate Politburo member Boris Ponomarev served as another occasion for Moscow to stress the bipartisan nature of U.S. support for detente and to voice confidence that any foreseeable administration would not essentially alter current foreign policy. It also served to point up Moscow's awareness of the domestic realities on the U.S. political scene and its concern to insure itself against unpleasant surprises by cultivating relations with Democratic leaders and with public figures not associated with the Administration. Soviet media have pointed out that the Ponomarev visit served to establish closer communications with Congress, institution that Moscow called during the visit the "focal point" of opposition to U.S.-Soviet detente. Senator Kennedy's red carpet treatment during his late April visit to Moscow and his lengthy session with Brezhnev illustrate the same concern.

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EUROPE

MOSCOW BLAMES LONDON, MILITANT PROTESTANTS FOR CRISIS IN ULSTER

In comment on developments in Northern Ireland over the past three weeks, Moscow has strongly condemned the militant Protestants, likening them to Hitler's stormtroopers and accusing them of seeking to establish a "Rhodesia-type fascist regime." In characterizing the course of events since Protestant militants called a general strike in mid-May, Soviet commentators have frequently repeated a statement by British Prime Minister Wilson that Northern Ireland faces "the gravest crisis in her history." When the strike led to the collapse on 28 May of Ulster's five-month-old coalition government of Protestants and Catholics, Moscow quickly denounced the development as the result of a "rampage of violence" by the militant Protestants, combined with a weak appeasement policy by British and Ulster authorities.

WORKERS DECEIVED In denouncing the tactics and goals pursued by Protestant militants, Moscow has sought to distinguish between militants and workers and to depict the mass of Protestant and Catholic workers as faced with a range of common economic problems and the quasi-collusive policies of London and "Protestant extremism." During the Moscow radio program "A Glance at the British Scene" on 22 May, for instance, commentator A. Azarin said that workers participating in the general strike had either been intimidated or deceived. He accused militant strike leaders of aiding British capitalist and monopoly interests by "splitting the working class movement" and diverting Protestant workers from the "class struggle," as well as assisting London generally in an "old colonial divide-and-rule tactic." PRAVDA on 24 May characterized the militants as reactionary ultra-right terrorists who do not represent the "genuine will of the workers" and who are determined to prevent a just political settlement in Ulster.

BRITISH APPEASEMENT Throughout the current crisis Moscow has sharply criticized London's policies, alleging that British authorities have shown excessive forbearance toward the Protestant militants and thereby encouraged them to further extremes. Much Soviet comment along this line has centered on British troop actions and attitudes in Ulster. Typical was a commentary by G. Ariyevich on Moscow's domestic service on 27 May, which accused the troops of failing to act firmly against "rampant fascists," in sharp contrast to their harsh treatment of the Catholic

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dissidents and militant Irish Republican Army in previous crises. Some of the comment has interpreted this apparent double standard as evidence that the troops view the Protestant militants as allies in the suppression of a broad-based civil rights movement in Ulster and "pacification of the province by force." Other comment has stressed that London, when confronted with Protestant militancy, had revealed only a "bankrupt policy" of vacillation and appeasement and had capitulated to the militants' demands.

To underscore its criticism of British policy and Protestant extremism, Moscow has emphasized a very bleak outlook for Ulster. TASS correspondent Yu. Solonitsyn on 4 June, for instance, reporting the end of a two-day British parliamentary debate on Northern Ireland, commented that many now fear the situation in Ulster will soon "deteriorate disastrously" because Protestant militants, "having sensed their power, will try to get new concessions from London." Solonitsyn did not elaborate the point, but other recent Soviet comment has suggested that the Protestants' ultimate goal is an independent Ulster. Moscow has denounced such a goal in strong terms, warning that the current crisis entails the danger of "a Rhodesia-type fascist coup."

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

MAJOR PRAVDA ARTICLE SUPPORTS WORLD PARTY CONFERENCE

A cautious further step in Moscow's low-keyed public campaign to convene a new international conference of communist parties was taken in a 5 June PRAVDA editorial article registering CPSU "support" for other parties' efforts in behalf of a new gathering. The article marked the fifth anniversary of the opening of the 1969 Moscow world conference. While the TASS summary versions of the article carried late on the 4th and early on the 5th hewed to generalities in supporting efforts aimed at "consolidating the communist movement," another summary broadcast by Moscow radio in English to Great Britain and Ireland on the 4th went further--it described the article as "seconding the proposal for convening a new world communist conference."

As reported by TASS, the editorial article alluded to proposals now being advanced by other communist parties for "new major joint steps" toward international "ideological and political consolidation." And it went on to declare: "The CPSU is ready to support the concrete initiatives and to participate in their implementation jointly with other Marxist-Leninist parties." Prefacing this expression of support, TASS quoted the article as stating that while considerable progress had been made since the last conference in combating right and left revisionism and "Maoism," "important tasks of further struggle against all kinds of hostile ideology remain in the order of the day."

Aside from "supporting" the initiatives of other parties, PRAVDA reiterated substantially the remarks on this score by Ponomarev in his 22 April Lenin day speech:

Many fraternal parties are putting forward proposals aimed at further increasing the role of the communist movement in social development and at strengthening its political and ideological cohesion. Together with the fraternal parties, the CPSU is ready to undertake new steps toward those aims.

Ponomarev's remarks were likewise prefaced with an attack on the Peking leaders. His expression of the CPSU's readiness to participate in the "new steps" had represented a further step forward from the position taken by the 30 March PRAVDA editorial article on the third

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anniversary of the 24th CPSU Congress, which had merely said the CPSU "deeply understands" the other parties' urge to hold new discussions in view of the changed international situation since the 1969 conference.

While Moscow's East European allies and a number of nonbloc communist parties have publicly endorsed a new conference, heretofore Moscow itself has stopped short of an explicit endorsement. This caution may be explained by the Romanians' open opposition to any gathering convened to criticize the Chinese, as well as by the absence so far of any groundswell of support for a new meeting among other communist parties.

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YUGOSLAVIA

SOVIET BLOC VIEWS LCY CONGRESS WITH SATISFACTION

Moscow and its East European orthodox allies reacted to the 10th congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, 27 to 30 May, by praising Tito's policies of political "consolidation" as a validation of communist orthodoxy. Comment was limited, focusing largely on Yugoslav domestic affairs. Notably absent was comment from the Romanian communist party, the Warsaw Pact maverick. Through 2 June, the Romanian party daily SCINTEIA had limited its coverage to extensive reportage on the congress.

Despite some use of terms like "historic" and "important landmark" to describe the congress, commentary on it was very light. Such reticence presumably stems from the fact that the congress was itself anti-climactic, culminating a two-year campaign by the LCY leadership to tighten party discipline and reassert the party's leading role in society. As the Polish party daily TRYBUNA LUDU reported on the 31st, "The consolidation and unity of the party demonstrated in all congress speeches is not accidental. It has been worked out by the LCY over the past three years through a large-scale political and social offensive." Sparse comment on foreign affairs was confined primarily to Yugoslavia's improved relations with the bloc countries and particularly the Soviet Union. Even official responses to Tito's election as party head for life were late in coming, with immediate congratulations sent by only GDR's Honecker and Czechoslovakia's Husak.

MOSCOW REACTION

Moscow radio--which along with the Moscow press and TASS had provided heavy daily coverage of the congress--in an Aleksandr Shakin dispatch on the 31st described the congress as an "important landmark" for Yugoslavia. Shakin concluded that the LCY had been "considerably strengthened," and he cited as specific evidence the reorganization of the party, the reestablishment of the central committee, the emphasis on democratic centralism and the reelection of Tito. Shakin pointed to "a more active influence exerted by the party on the whole course of economic events," a reference to the LCY's partial return to centralized planning. Shakin's account of foreign policy mirrored the congress discussions and documents in highlighting the LCY's improved relations with the bloc countries, adding that a "considerable" advance had occurred in Yugoslav-Soviet relations and that LCY-CPSU ties are developing "success-

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fully." However, his report predictably ignored the congress' strong reaffirmation of nonalignment, referring only to Yugoslavia's "energetic struggle for peace and support for the national liberation movement."

EAST EUROPEAN REACTION

Emphasis on Yugoslavia's domestic affairs was also dominant in East European comment. Reflecting Czechoslovakia's sensitivity toward revisionism, its party delegate Josef Kemptny told MTI on the 31st that the experiences of the Yugoslav communists "as well as our own experience" attest to the critical importance of a "firm unified party, ideologically united in action and . . . guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism." Prague's RUDE PRAVO as well as "Voice of the GDR" correspondent Joachim Reabe, among others, referred in particular to the "lesson" that the Yugoslav congress provided all socialist countries. RUDE PRAVO on 1 June saw that lesson in terms of the conventional bromides about "objective" laws of socialism, the "leading" role of the working class, and above all the overriding importance of the "common"--i.e., Soviet-style--rather than the "specific" features of socialism. And Reabe commented on the 31st that regardless of the "concrete formulations" that apply to Yugoslavia or any country, "if certain principles fail to be observed, socialism is endangered."

East European comment on foreign policy aspects of Tito's main report and the congress resolutions was limited mainly to references to Yugoslavia's commitments to peace and détente and improved relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

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INDOCHINA

HANOI AND LAO PATRIOTIC FRONT PROTEST U.S. BASES IN THAILAND

Hanoi has escalated its campaign for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Thailand, appealing for international support in a 30 May foreign minister's note to the signatories of the 1962 Geneva agreement on Laos. The note is the first such message Hanoi has sent to the Geneva conference participants since early 1965, when North Vietnam abandoned its practice of regularly addressing protests to the signatories or cochairmen of the 1962 Laos agreement and the 1954 Geneva agreement on Indochina. On the same day that Hanoi's note was released--just five days before the deadline for withdrawal of all foreign military personnel from Laos--the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) Central Committee spokesman issued a statement similarly protesting U.S. bases in Thailand and, in addition, assailing alleged continuing U.S.-Thai military involvement in Laos.

The DRV foreign minister's note requests that the signatories of the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos "use their influence to secure a correct implementation of the agreements" by the United States and Thailand. It demands that the United States "immediately and completely" withdraw its military forces, dismantle its bases in Thailand, and end its military involvement in Indochina. The note calls upon the Thai administration to forbid U.S. use of Thai territory for "aggression and intervention" in Indochina. Going beyond the DRV note, the LPF spokesman directly demanded that Thai authorities "dismantle" U.S. bases and forbid U.S. intervention in Indochina from Thai territory.

In an elaborate documentation of its objections to the bases, the DRV note claims that their use by the United States to "oppose the peoples" of Indochina violates the 1962 Geneva agreements, the 1973 Vientiane agreement, the Paris peace agreement on Vietnam, and the act of the International Conference on Vietnam. While official DRV statements since the signing of the January 1973 Vietnam agreement have occasionally denounced the U.S. military presence in Thailand as a threat to the countries of Indochina, previous statements have not spelled out such a detailed case for the removal of the bases. The current indictment was anticipated, however, in an 18 May DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the "so-called" withdrawal of part of the U.S. forces from Thailand, which had charged that U.S. use of the bases against Indochina violated the 1962 agreement.

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Hanoi's last previous note to the 1962 conference participants was sent on 22 January 1965 and protested alleged U.S. air strikes in Laos. Since that time official Hanoi statements, for the most part, have shied away from even calling attention to the responsibility that other signatories of the 1962 agreement have to influence its implementation. After March 1965 Hanoi similarly refrained from sending notes to the participants in the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina. Since the Paris International Conference on Vietnam last year, however, Hanoi has addressed formal notes to its participants about the situation in Vietnam. With the settlement of the conflict in Laos, Hanoi appears to have resumed its formal contact with the 1962 conference participants to disseminate similar protests concerning Laos.

Peking summarized the DRV note in a 1 June NCNA report which noted both its appeal to the signatories of the Geneva agreements and its demands for U.S. and Thai action. Moscow's brief TAG report on the note on 31 May did not indicate that it called upon recipients to bring pressure to bear on the United States and Thailand, reporting only that it had demanded Bangkok not allow U.S. use of Thai territory for "interference into the affairs" of Indochinese states.

THAI CABINET SHAKEUP PROMPTS HANOI, THAI CP CRITICISM

The recent Thai government crisis, marked by the resignation of the cabinet of Prime Minister Sanya Thammasak on 21 May and the formation of a new Sanya cabinet on 30 May, has elicited complaints from Hanoi and the Thai Communist Party about the conduct of Bangkok's policies since the overthrow of the Thai military administration last October. By contrast, Moscow and Peking have softpedaled criticism in their brief reports on the government shakeup.

HANOI In commentaries in NHAN DAN and QI'AN DOI NHAN DAN on 23 May pegged to the resignation of the first Sanya cabinet, Hanoi focused attention on the alleged continuity of the Sanya administration's policies with those of the previous Thanom-Praphat military administration. In particular, it cited the government's "repression" of "patriotic forces," the continued presence of U.S. forces in Thailand, and the fact that Bangkok's policy toward the DRV and other Indochinese countries "remains unchanged." NHAN DAN claimed the Thai people were "infuriated" over such policies and portrayed the Thai CP as representing a widespread view of caution toward the new government.

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QEAN DOI NYAN DAN was more explicit in its attack on Sanya's policies, accusing the administration of suppressing "communists," helping U.S. "lackeys" in Indochina, slandering the DRV, terrorizing Vietnamese residents in Thailand, and refusing to satisfy Thai popular demand for a withdrawal of U.S. forces. Hanoi's initial comment on Sanya's reappointment was a 2 June MRAN DAN commentary stressing that the military and police continued to hold "key ministries" in the new cabinet and denouncing Sanya's announcement that Thai foreign policy would remain unaltered.

Hanoi's reaction comes at a time of notably increased North Vietnamese public criticism of Thai policies on sensitive bilateral issues. In the week prior to the cabinet shakeup the DRV had set forth its conditions for improving relations with Bangkok, in the context of sharply criticizing Sanya for failing to follow through on his announced intention to show goodwill toward Hanoi.* Several authoritative DRV commentaries since then, including the 30 May DRV foreign minister's note, have focused on the continued presence of U.S. bases in Thailand.

THAI CP Thai CP comment, relayed by the China-based clandestine radio Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT), has been predictably more blunt in criticizing Sanya policies, stressing that the cabinet breakup was "nothing but a farce" staged by the "reactionary ruling class" to assuage popular opposition. Comment has highlighted the continuity between the Sanya government and the Thanom-Praprat regime, claiming that the new regime is basically the same "imperialist, feudalistic, and bureaucratic government" that continues to follow a "nation-selling, fascist, dictatorial, antinational, and antipopular policy." Detailing alleged Bangkok repression at home and the "sell-out" of Thai interests to the United States and other "imperialists" abroad, VOPT commentaries have noted particularly the Sanya regime's continued acceptance of U.S. bases and the CIA presence, and its use of Kuomintang remnant forces to suppress the Thai communist insurgency. They have also denounced the newly elected national assembly, claiming it represents only "big landowners and capitalists" and has a "stinking reputation."

A 30 May VOPT commentary emphasized that in order to establish a truly representative national government, the Thai people must "strengthen the forces of revolution" and "completely topple the U.S. imperialist, feudalistic, and bureaucrat-capitalist regime."

* Hanoi's approach is discussed in the TRENDS of 22 May 1974, pages 21-22.

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An article the following day underlined continued Thai CP belief that armed struggle is the main force for achieving these goals. While devoting favorable attention to other forms of "struggle" against the "counterrevolutionary dual tactics" of the Bangkok administration, the article stressed: "The people are aware of the necessity and correctness of armed struggle in order to achieve national independence and democracy. Without armed force the people will only fall victim to execution by the enemy. That would mean the struggle for national independence and democracy can never develop."

PRG, DRV CLAIM U.S. PILOTS FLYING SOUTH VIETNAM AIRSTRIKES

Vietnamese communist propaganda has charged that U.S. pilots have been flying combat missions in conjunction with alleged GVN bombing and strafing operations near Ben Cat. A Liberation Radio commentary broadcast on 2 June, in denouncing "barbarous attacks" by the ARVN in Binh Duong Province, described as "particularly serious the fact that U.S. aggressor pilots have flown F-5A's to indiscriminately bomb and strafe our compatriots." The commentary charged that the United States and the GVN used some 50 to 60 aircraft in their raids west of Ben Cat on 26 May, termed this "the most serious violation of the Paris agreement by the Americans and the Thieu administration since 28 January 1973 in eastern Nam Bo," and warned that the use of U.S. pilots was an "extremely serious new act of war."

Hanoi waited until 4 June before it broadcast its much milder account of the action, in a brief radio report complaining that the United States and Saigon had used aircraft "directly manned by U.S. pilots" in support of GVN military operations in Binh Duong. The Hanoi report did not characterize the seriousness of the action and also deviated from Liberation Radio's description of the fighter planes supposedly involved, specifying that they were F-5E's--the more modern version of the F-5A that Saigon has acquired in recent months.

Earlier Vietnamese communist charges of direct U.S. involvement in air attacks on PRG-controlled territory were made in May 1973, when raids allegedly were conducted in Tay Ninh and Binh Long provinces on the eve of a Kissinger-Le Duc Tho meeting in Paris.*

* For a discussion of the earlier protests, see the TRENDS of 16 May 1973, pages 5-7.

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The communist response at that time, however, was at a considerably higher level--including PRG and DRV foreign ministry statements which accused the United States of using F-4's for airstrikes against PRG territory in "extremely gross violation" of the Paris agreement. Le Duc Tho charged that the alleged U.S. airstrikes were aimed at pressuring the DRV and warned, in his 14 May 1973 arrival statement in Paris, that further attacks would jeopardize the holding of the U.S.-DRV talks.

COMMENT REPEATS PRG, DRV CONDITIONS FOR REACTIVATION OF JMC

Hanoi and PRG media have devoted considerable attention to the suspension of the four-party Joint Military Commission (JMC) meetings following the announcement on 30 May by the PRG's JMC delegation that it would not participate in JMC sessions until its conditions were met.* While a 30 May statement by the DRV delegation to the JMC supported the PRG move without stating that the DRV was also withdrawing from the sessions, comment since the statement has clearly indicated that North Vietnam has joined in the walkout.

While propaganda on suspension of the talks has been heavy, it has broken no new ground in charges leveled against the United States and Saigon. PRG and DRV foreign ministry spokesmen statements on the 31st routinely repeated complaints aired earlier in the military delegation statements--as did Liberation Radio, LPA, and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentaries. While the communist complaints are numerous, their conditions for resuming talks have focused mainly on demands for better Saigon treatment of the JMC delegations: immediate restoration of "normal activities" of the joint military organizations, "full and unconditional implementation of the privileges and diplomatic immunities," and a "serious" attitude in negotiations.

* For a discussion of the breakup of the four-party JMC sessions, see the TRENDS of 30 May 1974, pages 12-13.

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PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS

PEKING ESTABLISHES DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH MALAYSIA

Peking offered an effusive welcome to visiting Malaysian Prime Minister Razak during his 28 May-2 June visit to establish Sino-Malaysian diplomatic relations, treating the occasion as an example for other Southeast Asian nations to follow in normalizing relations with Peking. While Peking comment noted persisting Sino-Malaysian differences and refrained from praising Malaysia's internal policies, it lauded Kuala Lumpur's "neutralized" stance and suggested China and Malaysia share a community of views because of their mutual third world credentials. To broaden Peking's appeal to Malaysia and other Southeast Asian states, the Chinese were reassuring about Chinese intentions toward the pro-Peking insurgencies and the large Overseas Chinese populations in the area. Peking's focus on other Southeast Asian states as well as Malaysia was underscored by a 30 May NCNA replay citing positive reactions from official spokesmen of the four other ASEAN states to Malaysia's decision to establish ties with China, noting each government's determination to normalize relations with China.

Razak was greeted on arrival by Chinese officials led by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, who attended all working discussions with the prime minister, spoke at a banquet on 31 May, and accompanied him to Shanghai on 1 June. Chou En-lai, Chiang Ching and Li had a "friendly" talk with Razak on the 28th, and Chou spoke at a banquet in his honor that evening, Chou's first banquet speech since 6 May. Chou, Wang Hung-wen and Li attended Razak's "friendly and frank" talk with Mao on the 29th. Chou also attended talks with Razak on the 29th and signed the 31 May joint communique on the visit.

SINO-MALAYSIAN RELATIONS In building up to the "complete success" that marked Razak's visit, Chinese officials were careful to softpedal differences with the Malaysian Government while praising Kuala Lumpur's stand in foreign affairs. Chou's 28 May banquet address praised but did not explicitly endorse Malaysia's proposal for a zone of peace and neutrality in Southeast Asia, while a 28 May PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial lauded Malaysia's support for an Indian Ocean peace zone. Chou En-lai's banquet declaration that "superpower" pressure was the "main source of danger" for Southeast Asia was broadened in the communique to respond implicitly to Malaysia's desire for reassurance regarding Chinese intentions: The communique noted both sides' opposition to "all" foreign interference and aggression and their opposition

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to the establishment of hegemony or spheres of influence by "any country." Chou reassured the Malaysians regarding Chinese intentions, stressing that "the social system of a country can only be chosen and decided by its own people and cannot be imposed by others." But he balanced this stance by adding a reaffirmation of China's continuing "internationalist duty" to support revolution abroad.

The Chinese reassurance was also evident in that part of the communique dealing with diplomatic relations. The Chinese reciprocated Malaysia's recognition by agreeing formally to respect its "independence and sovereignty." Kuala Lumpur followed the recognition formula used in the March 1972 Sino-British communique and revived in the December 1972 FRC communique with Australia and New Zealand. In the English language text Malaysia "recognized" Peking as the sole legal government of China and "acknowledges" Peking's claim to Taiwan, but the Chinese text used the same word "cheng jen" (2110 6126) which is translated "recognizes" to cover Malaysia's stance on both Peking's legitimacy and its claim to Taiwan.

In contrast to the elaborate procedures regarding Overseas Chinese citizenship set forth in Peking's precedent-setting agreement on this subject with Indonesia in 1955, in the Malaysian communique the Chinese flatly declared that they do not recognize dual nationality and affirmed that Peking will protect the "proper rights and interests" of those Overseas Chinese who have not taken up Malaysian citizenship. Li Hsien-nien, speaking on the 31st, elaborated on Peking's stand, stressing China's desire to "encourage" Overseas Chinese to take up "of their own will" the citizenship of the country where they reside. There was no mention of Peking's past stress in the 1950's and 1960's that Peking stands ready to accept those Overseas Chinese who desire to return to China for permanent settlement.

MALAYAN CP The clandestine Malayan CP station in China--the Voice of the Malayan Revolution--issued an editorial on 25 May characterizing Razak's visit as evidence of the "bankruptcy of the Razak clique's long-held policy of hostility toward China." The editorial took pains not to imply criticism of Peking's decision to receive Razak and establish relations, asserting that "with its international prestige soaring to new heights," China is better able to play its role as an "impregnable revolutionary bastion." It noted that the visit to Peking by President Nixon, "waving the white flag of surrender," had shown the positive results of Peking's newly active foreign policy.

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The editorial categorically denounced Razak's intentions, asserting that he had replaced a policy of hostility with one of "double-dealing tactics" toward the PRC. Adding that Kuala Lumpur still blocks free interchange with China, it promised more struggle to make Razak open closer ties. The editorial made it clear there is no change in the Malayan CP insurgency line as a result of Razak's visit, asserting that PRC peaceful coexistence with Malaysia and peaceful coexistence within the country are separate issues. It reaffirmed determination to overthrow the "Razak-Lee Kwan-Yew cliques" by seizing political power through armed struggle.

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NOTES

SOVIET-JAPANESE ECONOMIC COOPERATION: On 31 May TASS labeled "absurd" and "tendentious" Western press reports implying that Soviet Petroleum Industry Minister Shashin had indicated in a 27 May interview that Moscow was losing interest in Soviet oil sales to Japan. Soviet media are not known to have publicized Shashin's interview, and the 31 May TASS report charging that his remarks had been "distorted" avoided giving any details as well as any reference to or reassurances on Soviet-Japanese joint oil exploitation. In other areas progress continues toward joint development of Siberian resources, with a 3 June announcement that the USSR and Japan had signed a 20-year agreement for joint development of East Siberian coal reserves. A 22 April Soviet-Japanese protocol had provisionally assured credits from the Japan Export-Import Bank for three major Siberian development schemes, including gas and timber as well as coal.

NEW PRC AIR FORCE COMMANDER: NCNA on 1 June identified Ma Ning as PLA air force commander, marking the first official replacement of any of the central military leaders who fell with Lin in 1971. Ma was identified at a banquet for a visiting Romanian officers' group headed by the Romanian air defense commander. Ma's appointment still leaves vacancies in the posts of minister of defense, chief of staff, head of the general logistics department, and navy political commissar--all formerly held by alleged Lin followers. The appointment of Ma is another sign of lessened PLA party authority. Though Ma was made a full member of the CCP Central Committee at the 10th party congress last August, he replaces Wu Fa-hsien, who was a member of the Politburo. Ma is a professional military man with no known experience in civilian political work. He appeared in Kirin during the years 1966-68 as a responsible military official, but fell from public view in the 1968-72 period, a time when the PLA was most deeply involved in political affairs. Ma surfaced in June 1973 in Peking as a responsible person of an unidentified department, presumably the air force.

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PRC PROVINCE ON FOREIGN TRADE: An unusually detailed Anhwei provincial broadcast on 30 May indicated continuing efforts to expand foreign trade ties, even though foreign trade has apparently been an issue in the ideological campaign against Lin and Confucius. The broadcast provided a detailed list of local items earmarked for export and reflected a longtime commitment to pressing foreign trade by revealing that a separate bureaucratic chain of command has been set up to pass central instructions from Peking through a hierarchy of foreign trade offices reaching down to the county level. The broadcast reported that a number of foreign trade work conferences have been held at the special district level to convey instructions on export goals from central authorities and the provincial foreign trade planning conference. The foreign trade offices of several Anhwei counties are now busy taking the export task "seriously" and insisting on "high-quality standards" for all export goods. Food products and animal skins--including mink--head the list of items selected for "expanding the sources of export commodities" and developing foreign trade.

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

RED FLAG ARTICLE TRACES PRC LEADERSHIP POLICY DIFFERENCES

An article in RED FLAG No. 5 defending current PRC policies through analogy to Han dynasty equivalents affords a rare look at issues not usually discussed in the Chinese media in any comprehensive fashion. The article's author, Liang Hsiao, argues on behalf of a number of policies which are associated with the Mao-Chou leadership and derides the program of Lin and his followers, implying that they were preparing to implement their reactionary program following Mao's death. Liang concludes that Maoist economic and defense policies have been successful in building a strong and cohesive state. He specifically praises the policies advocating resistance to the Soviet Union, strong central authority, and building all three economic sectors simultaneously.

Liang's article ostensibly details the struggle between Confucianists and Legalists following the death of Han Emperor Wu, whose adherence to legalist doctrines was allegedly the key to his success in building a strong state. The representative of the Confucianist side is an obvious Lin figure--Prime Minister General Huo--who called a conference following the emperor's death to decide the future of the state salt and iron monopoly. Liang notes that the Confucianists claimed merely to be conducting an investigation "into the commoners' sufferings"--a phrase reminiscent of Peng Te-huai's charges against the great leap forward at the 1959 Lushan conference--but that they actually had a "dangerous political motive" and sought to destroy the material base necessary for a series of progressive domestic and foreign policies.

Further pressing the Lin analogy, Liang notes that Huo "was not present" at the conference, but that his followers presented the Confucian position. Opposed to them at the conference was Imperial Adviser Sang--whose description seems to fit Chou En-lai--a man who "devoted scores of years to formulating and actively carrying out a series of important policies aimed at consolidating Emperor Wu's centralized government and opposing aggression by the Huns."

ECONOMIC POLICY Liang's article seeks to demonstrate that economic policy is a vital underpinning of the state structure and that a change in economic policies will seriously affect other, seemingly unrelated, areas. The specific policy he seems to be defending, presumably in response to some

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real attack on it, is Mao's policy of developing agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry simultaneously under the theory that, while agriculture is the base, the sectors are interdependent and development in one encourages progress in another. The other side of the argument, attacked by Liang as Confucianist, is the slogan "develop agriculture on a large scale." This slogan was said to have been raised in opposition to the legalist policy of developing "agriculture, industry, and commerce at the same time." The article argues that if the state did not control industry and commerce it would fall into the hands of "businessmen and slaveowners" who would grab more land, "sabotage agriculture" and undermine the central government economically.

The RED FLAG article seems to imply that some leaders, perhaps in the wake of recent slowdowns in agricultural growth rates, have opposed the Mao-Chou policies, favoring instead greater concentration on agriculture and freeing agriculture from central controls and quotas. There is evidence that Lin may have favored greater concentration on grain production, to the detriment of light industry, than has been allowed by Chou in recent years. During and immediately following the cultural revolution, when Lin was presumably at the height of his power, the PRC adopted policies favoring grain production almost to the exclusion of other crops, causing serious problems in industries dependent on agricultural raw materials. In recent years, with Chou seemingly in control, there has been a revived interest in industrial crops and on the need for communes to follow central guidelines in deciding which crops to plant. While the limited incentives policy followed since the end of the cultural revolution has been retained, there have been no further moves to "moderate" PRC agricultural policies.

DEFENSE ALLOCATIONS

The RED FLAG article's discussion of economic priorities led it into the area of resource allocation for national defense, a topic rarely mentioned in PRC media. The Han government's monopoly over salt and iron was said to have played a particularly important role in the success of Wu's policies by providing "ample financial resources for national defense." In arguing for policies which insure defense resources and in playing down war's "strain on manpower and material," the article seems to be alluding to issues that precipitated Lin's downfall and that remain topical subjects of discussion today. In a traditional "guns and butter" pattern, the argument would appear to divide those who favor maintaining economic inputs into the military at a rate necessary to provide China with a credible

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defense against a Soviet attack from those who believe that the PRC economy is stagnating and that more resources must be channeled into the civil sector, especially in agriculture. The article's arguments against regional authority suggest there is local resistance to maintaining the current share of resources allocated to modern military weaponry.

The issue is complicated, however, as positions on military allocations--especially the issue of whether to focus on advanced weaponry or on conventional forces--seem inextricably bound up with the question of who controls which organs. During the debate between "steel versus electricity," which surfaced briefly in PRC media just prior to Lin's fall, Mao was clearly on the "steel," i.e., conventional weapons side. In that case Lin controlled the central military apparatus which would have benefited most from increased advanced weapons allocations, and Mao and Chou apparently cemented relations with some regional leaders by arguing for increased conventional armaments. In the current situation, with Chou's ally Yeh Chien-ying apparently in control of the central military, positions may have shifted.

Underlying the defense policy positions is the question of Sino-Soviet relations. In Liang's article the problem is expressed in terms of the Hun threat during the reign of Emperor Wu. Opposing Confucian "capitulationism" in foreign affairs, Wu rejected the idea of subservience to strong neighbors, mobilized the vast economic and military forces of his unified state, and entrusted his defense to generals who had "risen from the slave class." Liang attributes to the Confucianists arguments that would be used to advocate a policy of accommodation with the Soviet Union--"the risk of national enslavement," the idea that "territory is useless," the aftermath "will last for generations," and "wives will live in anguish." In an apparent reference to Mao's personal opposition to the Soviet leaders, the Confucianists are said to have called for a "reconciliation of the two chiefs." Adviser Sang countered such arguments with the statement that the only way to deal with aggression was through preparedness, by defeating aggressors in war rather than through moral example.

MILITARY TACTICS In reporting Adviser Sang's call for a policy of "frontier defense, meaning 'building fortresses for defense and setting up plants to produce arms,'" Liang touches on a sensitive subject. There has been much dispute among PRC military leaders in the past over the correct line in military defense. During the cultural revolution both Peng Te-huai and Lo Jui-ching were criticized for advocating a

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static defense which did not "lure the enemy deep." Since the 1969 border clashes, however, there has been increased media attention to border defense, possibly reflecting a real change in Chinese military doctrine. A policy advocated by Lin Piao, "political border defense," which apparently called for political work in border areas without actually increasing military strength, dropped out of sight following Lin's fall, and PRC border defenses have since been strengthened.

Mao as well as Lin advocated a policy of flexible defense and "luring deep," during the guerrilla warfare period. However, recent PRC writings attacking Lin's military leadership have sought to present Mao as a master of conventional positional warfare. An article in the April RED FLAG, which criticized a booklet praising Lin's role in the Northeast campaign, shows Mao prodding Lin to actions leading to the enemy's annihilation, having to overcome Lin's timidity about making full-scale attacks. The implication of this shift in emphasis is that, faced with the choice of either showing the Soviets that they would risk a real war if they attempted to harass border areas or giving in to them, Mao decided to opt for building up border defenses and Lin decided against it.

Lin's attachment to people's war may have been greater than Mao's. In his September 1965 article on people's war he argued strongly that "in order to annihilate the enemy, we must adopt the policy of luring him deep and abandon some cities and districts of our own accord in a planned way." Apparently countering the views of Lo Jui-ching, Lin went on to specify that "we are firmly against dividing up our forces to defend all positions and putting up resistance at every place for fear that our territory might be lost"

**CENTRALISM VS.
REGIONALISM**

Liang stated that the domestic policy debate at the salt and iron conference really centered on the question "whether the state should remain unified or be divided," and was an attempt by the Confucianists to destroy the central government's power in order to allow slaveowners and reactionary landlords to regain power and establish their own principalities. His article is clearly aimed at regional Chinese leaders who have entrenched themselves in positions of local power and resist state directives. The article implies that some of them may have been reluctant to share economic progress and resources with the center.

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PRC policies on the issue of centralized versus regional authority have varied over the years, but evidence suggests that Mao and Chou have opposed strong regional authorities which might present a real threat to the center, while advocating some "isaway" on lower levels. The Kao Kang purge in the mid-1950's offered Mao an excuse to demolish the original regional party bureaus, and the bureaus reconstituted a few years later, apparently by Liu Shao-chi, were destroyed in the cultural revolution and almost all bureau officials were purged. The shift of military region commanders at the end of 1973 also fit the pattern of Mao and Chou working to prevent any regional authority from becoming a challenge to central state authority.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 27 MAY - 2 JUNE 1974

<u>Moscow (3062 items)</u>	<u>Peking (1109 items)</u>
Arab-Israeli Issue (3%)	12%
[Gromyko in Syria (--)	6%]
[Brezhnev Message to Syrian President (--)	4%]
Supreme Soviet Elections (12%)	10%
China (6%)	5%
Chile (5%)	5%
10th Yugoslav Party Congress (--)	5%
Austrian Chancellor Kreisky in USSR (--)	3%
Soviet-Egyptian Treaty 3d Anniversary (--)	2%
Malaysia Prime Minister Razak in PRC (2%)	18%*
[Joint Communique Cambodia Front Leaders in PRC (--)	3%]
Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius (4%)	7%
Former UK Prime Minister Heath in PRC (2%)	4%
Middle East (3%)	4%
PRC Reply to Soviet Border Statement (--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with Razak.